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DESCENT INTO THE VORTEX:
CONTRASTS AND AFTERMATHS OF THE COLLAPSE OF THE MILITARY EFFORTS
TO RULE IN POLAND AND THE USSR

This paper will explore the similarities and differences of the Polish experience
of military rule following martial law with the similar experience in the former USSR
in 1991, and the subsequent breakdown of the Soviet state and empire.

1.

Introduction
The first part of the paper compares certain trends of Poland in the 1980s and

the former USSR in the late '80s and early '90s. Similarities and differences between
the two cases will be explore_d, emphasizing the conditions of the state, the military
role in both societies, and the issues of political transition. The first part of the paper
was first written in the spring of 1991 emphasizing the evolution of the -now former
USSR toward a potential crisis of military rule, compared to the actual' crisis which
took place in Poland in the I980s. The original theme of that comparison was the
potential for political lessons for Moscow from the experience of Poland. The last part
of the paper written in the-Winter of 1992 continued the comparison _up through the
military coup and collapse of the USSR and its aftermath. The· paper" will explore the
crisis in the former USSR in two directions. First, we will look at the results of the
further deepening of the breakup of the state and empire, and a tracing of the major
trends recently transpiring following the coup and breakup. Secondly, we will tal<e
a cold and clear look at the limits of knowledge-in the social sciences about the-

-2current transition and dissolving of the Soviet state.
Briefly the-themes of comparison of the coll~pse of the military efforts to
rule in Poland and the USSR are as follows. Poland before the 1989 revolution had
evolved from a state of martial law to a military regime that was increasingly governed
from the top by a small military circle.

The Jaruzelski military regime and the

communist party itself had virtually dug its own grave by eroding its own power base
by a series of fatal blunders. Thus the main Polish experience in the 1980s was an
extremely strong rejection by the society of the military regime. The social rejection
of the regime was the main contributor to the total breakdown of both the state and
the communist party system. The main feature and the main cause of the c·ollapse
of communist power was that the society had totally divorced itself from the state in
the I980s and thereby stripped it of the power to obtain cooperation on most of its
many attempted reforms.
By comparison through the fall and spring of 1990 and into early 1991, the
Soviet political system seemed to be approaching the edge of a cliff. A liberalizing
experiment of vast proportions initiated by Gorbachev in 1986, intended initially to
produce a decentralization of political power and limited pluralism, had misfired into
several unexpected directions. The fall and the rise again of the Soviet military in the
mid to late I980s, the plans of Gorbachev to reform the economy and reduce the
importance of the military sector, _and the rise of national-separatism in the republics
are the three keys to the understanding of the development of the military rule crisis.

-3There were certain transitional conditions from 1986 to 1989 which led to the
edge of this cliff, and to the sudden increasing strength of the far right and elements
of the military in the USSR in 1990-91.

Gorbachev had found himself trapped by

several barriers by 1990. First there was a disastrous economic decline in the country
as a result of ill-planned partial reforms of the economy. Second there was a growing
crisis of the federal state system that featured growing ethnic and republic separatist
demands and civil strife, unleashed by glasnost. The reforms designed by Gorbachev
to liberalize the political order, and to a lesser extent the economy, produced the
intense pressures for the disintegration of the Soviet empire and the communist party
itself, largely based on national-separatist tensions and aspirations for independence
on the part of more than half of the republics. This in turn led to a regrowth of the
far right inside the CPSU and the military-KGB compiex, which yearned for a
restoration of the old order, and saw its path along the route of a military coup.
In Poland things were different. Social resistance, noncompliance and alienation
resulting from martial law had stymied ql.!ite significant liberalizing reforms in the
economy and in politics in the mid-I980s, whic~ in fact preceded Gorbachev's reforms
by a full year. This political stalemate and failure of policy initiatives of the Jaruzelski
regime

meant that the communist party slowly lost power to an increasingly

desperate military regime, until the fatal year of protest and revolution that started in
Poland in the summer of 1988 with labor strikes and spread rater throughout Eastern
Europe in the following year.
Poland emerged from the crisis of military rule with a far-reaching and fairly well

-4thought-out economic reform plan designed to move the country into a mixed market.
Politically Poland moved first into a form of techno-bureaucratic rule, and then into a
form of social democracy and a fractioning of political interests and parties in its most·
recent phases. In the end it seems that Poland may weather its transition both in
politics and economics, which contrasts with the quickly dissolving Soviet empire.
The outlines of this fate, and the trends and developments which portend the
unfolding reality in the former USSR are only dimly perceived by the Western media,
and can be only partially grasped by the social sciences, a point that ·we will elaborate
in much greater detail later in the paper. Having sketched the brief outline.s of this
comparison, we will now return to the details of the evolution of the two cases.

2.

Poland's Descent into and Rebirth from Military Rule·

Followi_ng the declaration and imposition of martial law in Poland in December
of 1981, and the crushing and imprisonment of Solidarity activists, the nation and
Polish society retreated into traditional Polish diversions and social behaviors which
are traditional compensatory reactions to Poland's long history of occupations. Thus
Polish society in the years immediately following martial law exhibited a rise in_ the
birth rate, a return to religious practices and life, an increase in alcoholism, a return
to poetry and literature, and of course, the formation of an underground resistance of
the remnants of Solidarity,- marked by an underground press and lively discussion of
,

,

how to recast a successful future resistance.
Blue collar strata became disenchanted both with the regime and -with
Solidarity, and also refused participation in the officially sponsored unions, and self-

-5management schemes prevalent in the mid I980s. These well-known trends have
been well-documented by a number of studies (see review in Hamilton,- 1991).
In essence, Polish society reacted with revulsion against the illegitimate use of
power, and retreated from political involvement, and all regime reforms.

In

counterreaction to this loss of control, the main response by Jaruzelski was a
remarkable consolidation and centralization

of military power and figures over

communist party political machinery by 1986. The process began with

a purge of the

party itself as early as late 1982 (Trybuna Lu~u, 13 Feb. 1983) and was pursued ,in
several ways, such as redrafting a military reform law that empowered the ~ational
Defense Committee with civilian and former party powers to direct the economy and
reforms, and a reshuffling of personal military associates into high party posts
(Kuklinski, 1987; Trybuna Ludu, 26 July 1982; Zolnierz Wolnosci, 27 Feb. 1986).
Another accelerator of this increase of military rule was the national spectacle
and tragedy of the murder of the _priest Popieluszko by security officials, and the
subsequent trial of the security a-pparatus and removal of the highest security officials·,
by Jaruzelski. This was important not only for social reasons (to respond to society's
outrage) but it also marked what became an intense personalized assault by Jaruzelski
on the secret police structures (New York Times, 25 May 1988; Poland's Leaders
CIA, 1987: 8).
By 1986 a true military regime ruled Poland, standing atop a nominal communist
party structure that had been dramatically weakened over several years. The state
was virtually gove~ned by a narrow handful of close Jaruzelski military associates.

-6.Throughout the I980s government economic advisers and central planners had·
introduced two waves of partial economic reforms, the last of which by 1987-89
reached almost frantic levels of reform in dismantling the central economic planning
-

'

apparatus, and introducing deregulation of export enterprises, and various reforms of
state enterprises (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Situation Report, 16 Dec. 1988:9).
These reform efforts were regarded as "too little too late" to stimulate mod·ernization,
productivity, export viability, and increased domestic production and consumption of_
consumer goods. The basic industrial core of the economy was increasingly obsolete,
and environmentally damaging to an extreme degree. Also, throughout the mid to late
I980s, the regime sponsored a massive campaign for national reconciliation,
liberalization and dialogue for national direction. This campaign included new self
management laws, and a decensorship of the press which predated glasnost in the
USSR. All of this too was essentially ignored by the society, the main result of which
was an even deeper increasing desperation and isolation of the regime to influence the
national direction of politics, economics and social trends.
Poland was also locked into a major "socio-political divorce" of the society and
the regime, that spelled or created a major societal retreat into alternative modes of
living and diversion (Hamilton, 1991 ). In the meantime Solidarity had redeveloped a
far-flung empire which discussed fully various strategies of socio-economic-political
reform. The full extent of Solidarity underground activities is still not yet fully brought
to light.

.
In 1987, the military regime under Jaruzelski's strong personal control had failed

-7on a number of counts. It had failed to gain support o,r cooperation of the population
in labor initiatives, political participation reforms, public elections etc. Second, it had
failed to overcome societal skepticism and alienation. Third it had failed to squash the
underground networks of Solidarity, and had been forced in fact to release Solidarity
activists in 1984 as part of its doomed program of national reconciliation (Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Report, 10 April, and 3 Aug. 1984). It had also failed to reform
and revitalize the economy (Trybuna Ludu, 25 May 1987).

All of this occurred

despite major efforts, and an increasingly centralized Jaruzelski control over the
political structures of the party, and constant appeal,s for national unity and survival.
By 1988 the las'.t blows against the system were struck rather hard and fast.
In the first place, by that year the Polish communist party's system of power in reality
had already virtually eroded away. Second, by the spring and summer of that year,
labor strikes were spreading and seemed unstoppable as shows of force by the
leadership failed to stem the crowds (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Report, 26 Aug.

1988: 8); Initial proposals to rescue the regime from strikes by resuming negotiations
between Solidarity and the government in August were at first probably a delay,
divide and confusion strategy which this time would no longer work (Trybuna Ludu,
16 Sept. 1988).

The key development besides the resignation of the economist

Messner's government in October (Trybuna Ludu, 20 Sept. 1988) was that Jaruzelski
himself had joined against the remaining communist party hard-liners and . with .
"nationalists" in the party in a December central committee meeting. The upshot of
this was that by January of 1989, the communist party state system was edging

-8toward a showdown with Solidarity in the negotiations. It now found itself isolated
'

by Jaruzelski who had effectively "switched sides" to favor a national dialogue and
reform that would accommodate political libe.ralization, if not a national rebirth of
Poland. The political grave was effectively dug for the communists following the
summer 1989 elections, when a handful of hard-line communists led by Rakowski
attempted to stall the formation of a non-communist government coalition only to be
outmaneuvered by pressure from both Jaruzelski and Gorbachev to accep·t the noncommunist government. The Post-Communist Era had mostly clearly begun with
these events, as similar events unfolded in turn in the Fall of 1989 in the rest of
Eastern Europe.
The quickly unfolding economic reform of Poland, initiated by Deputy Prime
Minister Leszek Balcerowicz in the Fall of 1989, effectively began the demolition of
the centralized economy, and its evolutionary replacement by a mixed, and
increasingly privatized economy. By 1991, Poland was well into the middle phases of
its· transition not only to a market, but also to a functioning although fractionated
social democracy. The result of military rule was first social resistance, and then
rebirth of a noncommunist Poland.

3.

The USSR's Descent into the August 1991 Attempted Military Coup
In the Soviet Union, the events were in somewhat of a reverse order. As a

result of political liberalization and economic tinkering beginning in early 1986, the end
of the I980s saw the USSR as basically a federalist state in disintegration.

The

disintegration was fueled mainly by nationalist revolts and ethnic conflicts based

-9mainly in the republics, first in the Salties, and then spreading to Georgia, Moldavia,
and ultimately the Ukraine and moslem republics. It was not resistance to reforms,
but the unforeseen pace of uncontrollable expressions of liberalization and separatism
that spun the system apart.
'

By 1990 the integrity of the state itself was greatly

this posed to the security apparatus and military had pushed
weakened, and the threat
.
the system to the brink of a crisis with the potential of a military-style coup. There
were certain transition conditions which led from the reforms to the attempted military
coup of August 1991.
For one, the Soviet military system, especially the staff had been increasingly
threatened over the last three years.of the 1980s in a variety of ways. By the late fall
of 1990, Gorbachev had looked -at the re-emergence of hard-liners in the party and
security-military apparatus as an uneasy ally against separatist forces threatening to
tear the federation asunder. Back in 1986, the Soviet military seemed to be a virtually
unshakable military-industrial complex. It was headed by a privileged and politically
powerful general staff. It also held profound influence in foreign affairs and national
security policy, as well as domestic economic planning and investment. It had huge
claims on the national budget, perhaps as much as 25 % of the GNP when counting
off-budget expenses. By early 1986, the system was only a little less militarist and
neo-Stalinist than it had been under Brezhnev.
After 1987, the Soviet military complex had suffered a m.ulti-faceted challenge
to its power in the political system, and its role in party rule. Thi1s challenge was
under the influence, or the cover· and penetration of a partial economic reform,

-10promoted by Gorbachev. He had initiated a "double whammy" assault on the military.
One side of the assault involved reduction of the military budgets; economic
conversion plans and directives to divert resources away from the military to social
needs (Herspring, 1986, and 1987).

A second side of the assault involved new

foreign policy goals stressing reduction of t_ensions, reduction of arms, the INF,
conventional forces reduction and START treaties (Pravda, 29 June 1988). This also
included the later and bigger challenges of the reunification of Germany, and the
dissolving of the Warsaw Pact.
Initially Gorbachev essentially proposed that a "swap" would be in the military
and state's best interests. General reductions in commitment to the military would be
"swapped" for a "package deal" that promised modernization (resulting from a
revamping of the technological efficiency and innovativeness of the reformed
economy) and a lessened threat from abroad due to significant arms treaties with
NATO and a general lessening of tensions. A more "lean and mean" military would,
it seemed, be in the best interests of all. Also, Gorbachev pursued his assault on the
military through replacements on the general staff (Pravda, 23 Feb. 1987: 2),
emphasis and reliance on the ministry of foreign affairs and civilian foreign policy
institutes for foreign policy advice (Pravda, 8 Nov. 1985: 1-2; Pravda, 23 Feb. 1986:

2; Parrott in Colton and Gustafson, 1990: 80).
This was a direct challenge to the status of role of both the military and the
security establishment's influence on foreign affairs.
All of this was a more or less acceptable scheme of developments to the

_,, _
military hierarchy until the onset of four simultaneous major developments that
apparently challenged or threatened core interests of the military and right wing hard- \
line elements. One was the threat of the erosion of basic interests and political power
derived from the events just described, which eroded the military's prestige, budget
and foreign policy clout.

A second were deep-seated anxieties over the anti..:

communist revolutions in 1989-90 in Eastern Europe, especially the encroaching
collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and the nervousness produced in the Soviet military by
German unification after September 1990. These events outraced the general staff's
traditional paradigm of what was security for the Soviet Union (and the same views
predominated inside the KGB as well).

Gorbachev's direct involvement in East

European revolutions, his willingness to consider German reunification issues, his
tolerance of the growing Baltic independence movements, and his dealings with the
West on arms reductions increasingly looked like one-sided unilateral concessions
(especially the INF, and force reductions negotiations). All this compounded by late.
1990 to present a threat to right wing interests and to sentiments in the military
establishment (Parrott, in Colton and Gustafson, 1990: 79-8 l).

There was perhaps

not a severe split between the military and Gorbachev on these issues until late 1990.
In 1989 and 1990 ethnic unrest and Baltic separatism reached a chaotic, fever pitch.
Concerns about the viability and stability of the Soviet Army were heightened as the
Red Army had been organized on the basis of conscripts from the republics, and
questions existed about the loyalty of republic based forces, perhaps even including
security forces.

-12By the fall of 1990 and into 1991, it was clear to many observers that the status
and political power of the far right had been pressing Gorbachev to make
compromises and concessions to their interests.
But what are the similarities and differences of the two cases:

of the

ascendancy of military rule in Poland and attempted power grab in the former USSR?
First we contrast the status of the state in the two nations.
In Poland, an increasingly centralized clique governed a military regime that sat
atop an insipid and ineffective communist party in the I980s.

Poland eventually

emerged as a social democracy with a privatizing mixed market economy following
the overthrow of the military regime. The military and party rule had been effectively
abolished by the societal resistance (and the potentialities of overthrow allowed for
by Gorbachev). In contrast, in the USSR the state was suffering a different political
fate at the turn of the decade.' A quasi martial law regime was beginning to emerge,
astride conditions of severe civil strife and national separatism. Efforts to unify the
disintegrating state with a state or union treaty in July 1991 clearly triggered the coup
attempt, a last ditch effort to retain central government power and restore control by
the more hard-line communists a.nd KGB leadership. In reality, this attempt to retain
the center in conditions -of the disintegration of the federalist state proved to be as
effective as keeping a candle lit in a thunderstorm.
The military role is also in contrast in the two systems. In Poland in the I980s,
the military role in power, society and economy was constantly in decline, Particularly
after the 1989 revolution there is no Polish military industrial complex in power. There

-13are only remnants of the defense enterprises; commitments to the Warsaw Pact had
been dis:mantled, and the military related enterprises were under attack by the policies
of the government that seek to decapitalize, or to privatize the economy and
shutdown or convert obsolete enterprises. All of this is despite the fact that Soviet
troops r~mained on Polish soil until the time of the August coup. The withdrawal of
those tr6ops is still uncertain, although speeded up withdrawals seem in the offing.
. l

In: the USSR just before the coup attempt, the status of the military in the
society and economy was on a roller coaster. Reconversion of the military industries,
and rebl)dgeting had seemed to stall in late 1990 and 1991, as the regime was coping
with the Baltic separation crises. The military seemed to be a reluctant ally in the
mainten~nce of Soviet federalism, as security establishment worries and excesses
Sfemed to be the most likely explanation for massacres by KGB forces in the Salties
I

ii") the winter of 1991. By August, there were only small elements of the military that
'

I

'

'

cooperated with the coup attempt, despite the direction of Marshall Yazov.
The political transition conditions are different in the two countries as well.
T;oday in Poland, the social democracy is built upon a fractionalized party and interest
system. : The entire system is perhaps slanting towards a populist authoritarian era
I

,

I

.

under Walesa's presidency. The political passage after the military coup through the
cbllapse ;of the USSR is a much darker tunnel, involving many more uncertainties.
\

\

I

4'. CIS Trends and Trajectories since the Coup and the Breakup of the USSR

\/Ve now consider what has happened in the USSR and what can and can't be
easily known since the August 1991 coup attempt, and since the breakup of the
'

I

I

-14USSR ·into the new Commonwealth of Independent States from January of 1992.
What has happened to the USSR since the collapse of military rule is of a
dramatically different order than events· in Poland.
panorama of trends and surprising developments.

We are witnessing a vast
The crumbling of the USSR

resembles a roller coaster ride through the wildest of political scenarios. Selected
examples will simply illustrate this roller coaster ride in the social, political and
economic sectors.
In the political arena, the failure of the coup triggered an avalanche of pent-up
political forces and developments.

Any viable challenge by the old· conservative

communist political apparatus inside the union, and in virtually all the republics had
been shattered by the rise of republic de facto sovereignties, the collapse of the L.'1SSR
by January of 1992, and its replacement by the CIS. Many if not ,most of the coup
leaders, and the elite KGB apparat are up for trial in the Russian republic. By October
1991, the dismantling of the political monopoly of the CPSU and its political control
structures was almost complete. Even the dramatic efforts by Gorbachev to find a
solution for political and economic union treaties was complicated by lack of
attendance to meetings on the treaties, or to announced signings (the November 25
attempted signing of the drastically decentralized union treaty was disbanded on
· camera for lack of attendance, and the cf raft was sent to the republic legislatures for
review).

By late fall, the former empire was devolving into its various par.ts and

republics. More than half the republics by October were increasing their sovereign
control over their economies, refusing to abide by delivery agreements of trade and

-15resource shipments among republics, and laying claim to control of border pblice and
i
even military forces. By November it had become less likely that even
minimal
j
economic union treaty could initially be signed to replace the former Soviet Union, and

J

to stabilize interrepublic trade and economic issues. By January, the old USSR was
formally buried.
At the end of 1991, a chaotic struggle for political power, leadership ·and
institutional structure was focused mainly inside the various republics and in local
politics.

In the social arena, ethnic violence and conflict arose to new· heights,

especially in the southern. regions of the country as Soviet forces were withdrawn in
December and January.

.

I

The severe interrepublic tensions, particularly between

Armenia and Azerbaijan and between the Ukraine and Russia, and severe intrarepublic
tensions in the Caucasus, accele"rated throughout January and February;

Social

conditions generally worsened in urban life as the winter approached. There is a
tumultuous and wide-ranging search or yearning in the diverse CIS population for
collective identity and meaning. One manifestation of this is a "rush to natibnalism"

i

and a mythologizing of ethnic-national history even where historical sovereignties,
'

literature, identities and even borders cannot be eas.ily reconstructed a~ having
1

historical certainty or stability (Chechezh-lngush in Georgia, for example). Another
manifestation of this search and yearning is the widely noted resurgence ~f ethnic

I
I

hostilities, and a lesser noticed but deep search for spirituality (especially in the
Western-Christian zones of the old empire).
The unravelling of the economy and economic reforms in 1992 played out into

-16four general zones:

the attempted initiatives of the new CIS agreements; the

attempted initiatives, decrees and actions of the republic governments; the rise of a
barter economy in rural areas, and increasingly in urban areas; and finally the emerging
regime of immediate foreign aid, technical assistance, food assistance, and
penetration of foreign capital. There is also the slowdown and virtual collapse of the
centrally

planned

industrial,

distribution, and

consumer

production

sectors,

accompanied by rampant stockpiling and hoarding. By the turn of the year, economic
conversion of the Soviet military production facilities in Russia and Ukraine may finally
be reaching

a true

startup phase, but production output was reported to be rapidly

falling in both major republics (New York Times, 6 Feb. 1992). In mid-winter 1991-2
a crisis of supply and inflation worsened (Russian economic chief Gaidar reported a
tripling of prices in January alone, seeing signs of an inflation slowdown by late
February).

This crisis grew under the stimulus of many new economic policies,

initiated by both the old center and the Russian republic governments which include
private property laws, republic seizure of central government assets, and free floating
prices. All official economic initiatives have been roundly criticized by economists for
being "half-baked", "foot-dragging", and "ill-planned". They all seem to fall short of
the integrated plan of privatization followed in Poland.
Following the breakup of the USSR in January of 1992, two sets of
contradictory forces propelled events inside the new Commonwealth. One set of
internal forces had the main effect of producing a crisis of government incapacity and
· a political "downward spiral", especially in Russia toward a potential takeover by a

-17nationaliSt/military regime. This trend has vague parallels to the situation of stalemate
in Poland in 1980, which ended in a military regime takeover. These internal forces
involve mainly the conditions inside and divisive contentions between Ukraine and the
Russian republic.

Between the two major republics, the divisive issues included:

economic trade and the closing of cross-border shipments of goods and services,
ownership of capital resources and currency issues (Ukraine had a new de facto
currency by January, based on food stamps, partly as a reaction to perceived Russian
threat to flood CIS with the hyperinflated ruble). Other divisive issues compounded
the split, including: Ukrainian-Russian disputes over control of the old Soviet military,
Ukrainian attempts to· raise up national forces, including appropriating parts of the
Black Sea fleet, the divisive issue of Russian versus Ukraine control of the Crimean
peninsula, and the form and powers of the CIS, in which the Ukraine was markedly
reluctant to cooperate.

Throughout the winter months of 1991-2, these issues

continued to absorb the attention o~ the government and leadership of the two
republics, with the effect of distracting both republics' leadership from coping with
unresolved problems inside their respective republics.
Inside the republics, a number of similar factors coincided to weaken the
legitimacy, stability and capacity of both governments (particularly the Russian). The
inherently flawed, reactive and poorly thought-out "Yeltsin economic reform", the
worsening (mainly urban) economic supply and inflation conditions (also severe in the
Salties), and especially the possible rise of a Russian nationalist/military coalition
allegedly focused partly around or built by former air force general and Russian vice-

-18president Rutskoi.

All these trends interacted to stifle and erode the Russian

government's capacity to pursue effective economic and bureaucratic reforms (the
government of the Ukraine was more stable, in part due to a better food supply
situation, and less internal division in the government).- -This internally driven crisis of
government-capability especially in Russia was worsening in January and February of
1992 at-the same moment that the Yeltsin and Kravchik governments were absorbed
in their heightened interrepublic disputes mentioned above. The combined ~ffect of
the internal problems, and the absorption of leadership increasingly in interrepublican
disputes was to decrease the political stability and capacity for reform of both
governments, but particularly the Russian.
This trajectory of events toward a "downward spiral" was not unnoticed by the
German or other (particularly northern) European governments. Thro1.,1gh the winter
of 1991-2, following the pattern of the previous year, there was a great and almost
-- exponential increase in German and combined European humanitarian aid and
"technical assistance" to governments and to the emerging private sectors inside the
CIS European republics. The purpose of this vast regime of burgeoning European aid
and technical assistance (amounting perhaps to as much as $20 billion or more
through 1992 alone) was not solely for humanitarian, nor simply for neo-colonial
purposes of future economic exploitation of markets (as much as this sidebenefit
might play out for European corporatist motive~). -This regime of aid was perhaps
-primarily and deliberate!y intended to stabilize the emerging ·g_overnments of the
European CIS states in the short run. In the longrun, the de facto "European ~arshall

-19Plan" was meant to instill and stabilize the capacities of democratic governance,
program administration, and economic reform strategy into the new CIS states. The
goal of the de facto "new European Marshall Plan" was to counteract the "downward
spiral" especially of the European zone of CIS states, and particularly of Russia. This
was a powerful countervailing influence against the political-economic decay and
collapse of the new governments.
Of course, these primarily European political-economic aid strategies could not
directly alleviate the divisive internal issues of dispute such as ethnic violence in the
southern and Asiatic republics, "refugee" ethnic groups and conflicts in the other
republics, disputes about the new form of the CIS government, nor the growing
disputes between Ukraine and Russia.
Through the· winter, the unease of the former Soviet military establishment
increased in Moscow, and made itself heard in volatile meetings between Yeltsin and
the Soviet army officer corps and command at a meeting of the newly labelled
"Congress of Civic and Patriotic Forces" on February 8. There Yeltsin was persuaded
or forced to side with military leadership positions for a unified (Russian-led) military
command, and for countering Ukrainian attempts to solidify their control over armed
forces. Several hot disputes between Ukraine and Russia figured to be worsened by
these "nationalist trends" especially the dispute over the Black Sea fleet division,
Ukraine's claim to ports and to homefront sovereignty over armed forces, and disputes
over the form of a CIS unified military command. To the CIS (Russian-Shaposhnikov)
high command, all these disputes had coalesced to heighten their anxieties. of

-20abandonment and uncertainty.

These disputes also fed the emotions behind the

February street protests of nationalists, old-line communists and militarists in
Moscow, orchestrated in part by Rustkoi.
In France on February 6, Yeltsin issued public warnings about the possibility of
a threat from the Russian nationalist right. Throughout February Yeltsin attempted to
counter Rutskoi's brand of strident nationalist criticisms by stripping him of formal
powers in the government and of chairmanship of 5 major government committees,
and placing him nominally in charge of awiculture. This left Rutskoi with a choice of
tactics: manuever with old military contacts, publicly criticize the CIS and Yeltsin
government, and try to capitalize on and seem to lead the unwieldy and somewhat
disparate mid-winter ,street protests of nationalist and pro-communist groups.
By, February 15, yet another breakdown of CIS negotiations oecurred,
particularly over the unyielding resistance of Ukraine, Moldova and Azerbaijan
resistance to merge forces into a. unified CIS military or accept a unified military
command structure (particularly Russia's insistence on unified frontier troops, and
over the Ukrainian-Russian Black Sea fleet division). Voices in the Soviet military
hierarchy were publicly expressing the chance of an eventual drift again toward a
military takeover inside Russia by the Spring, if military issues and needs were not
addressed by the Yeltsin government, and/or if the economic situation did not radically
improve (New York Times, 15 Feb 1992, London Times 15 Feb. 1992, McNeil-Lehrer
Newshour, Feb. 14 1992). These themes ominously coincided with the criticisms by
Rutskoi and the warnings of Yeltsin, suggesting that a nationalist/militarist coalition
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of forces might be coalescing to challenge the Yeltsin government. Coinciding with
these veiled threats was the looming April IMF decision of whether or not to grant
further Western credits and aid to the Yeltsin government. It is an open question
whether a "nasce.nt Russian nationalist/militarist coalition", based on a balance of
factions in the old Soviet-Russian military command, is collectively "watching and
waiting" for the IMF aid decision as a benchmark or turning point for a challenge to
the Yeltsin government.

l

In any case, by mid-winter 1992 and into the spring, the countervailing trends
of "downward spiral" versus external stabilization, and the growing inter-republican
disputes over the military and the form of CIS governance place the government of
Russia in particular on a knife-edge balance between stability and development on the
one-hand versus a potential drift towards a nationalist/military regime on the other.

5.

The Limits of Knowledge About the Commonwealth
)

In the short term, what we can know about macro trends and their impact on
; civil-military relations in the CIS or even about the survival of any meaningful CIS
government is fairly limited. One of the reasoos for the limits of knowledge is that in
the former USSR, the dissemination of information is uneven, and ineffective, and
certainly is not on a coast-to-coast and national-to-local basis. It is possible to make
some estimate of what is not known or what is difficult to track in the short term .
. (It is at least as important in the social sciences to assess what can and cannot be
known, as it is to speculate about what is known on the basis of thin information).
In the political aren_a we do not know (and it will be difficult to track in the short
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to estimate the enactm·ent and oversight capacity of republic legislatures .. We do not
know whether any CIS agreements or reforms will have any impact on the formerly
national economy or republic administrations. It will take many months to evaluate
how successful the republic efforts to maintain sovereignty or national development
will be.
In the social arena, it is difficult to track the events and trends of the black
market and barter economy, and whether it will block the efforts of republic authority,
foreign aid, or CIS efforts to reinvigorate the patchwork national economy, avoid a
worsening of urban suffering, or reduce the potential for widening civil strife. It is
difficult to track whether ethnic-national conflicts and· interrepublic disputes will
I

escalate beyond disputes into sporadic violence, or even armed conflicts.
There are however, a few trends which can be tr.acked or traced, although most
of what the social sciences can monitor or analyze is roughly reduced to the realm of
semi-sophisticated, and mostly urban-focused journalism. In the political arena, we
can analyze and look at "talking head~" of state and republics, and introduc.e some
political estimation of who has clout and who does not. It may be possible for us to
ascertain the remaining direction of defense control and status of the military, as it is
one of the few remaining central structures to which Western analysts, particularly
the defense and intelligence apparatus are devot~d to examining. It is possible to
track the basic issues of interrepublic relations in the debate about the emerging CIS.
It is possible to track the multilateral aspects of foreign, economic and politicat
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powers and world regions.
In the social arena we are limited by the limits of the mass media to analyzing
primarily the urban-.centered issues of contemporary life and civil strife. Much less is
known, and will be known or recorded in coming months about developments and
conditions in rural areas and in the southern and Asian republics.
In the e~onomic arena it is possible to acquire a mainly urban~centered picture
of economic life and problems, and reform attempts. It is possible to ascertain the
direction and impact of foreign capital and penetration, immediate aid from Western
countries, and from private sources. It is difficult to track what forms and impact
republic reforms are taking, and what impact they will be having over the coming
several years. We do not know what impact republic sovereignty will have on the
military-to-economic conversion. We do not know which republic economic reform
efforts will succeed or fail in the short run. Will economic reforms in any republic
follow a coherent strategy similar to that which took place in Poland? Or is it more
likely to follow an incoherent pattern of multilevel, republic-based reform packages?
We do not even know the meaning or reliability of current economic statistics. It may
be possible to track changes in the basic structure of economic institutions down
perhaps to the republic level.

Even so, it will be very difficult to track the

implementation of economic reforms or problems that arise in the administration of
economic and public policy reforms. In the short term about all that can be done is
track the official status of decrees and reforms.

The much vaunted "global

-24information system" (primarily of the business world in any case) is likely to· provide
us with only slightly more quantity and reliable information on "business" issues than
for other issues of society and politics.

6.

Lessons from the Vortex of Military Rule

The aftermath of ttie descent into and out of military rule in both countries is
very different. In the case of Poland at critical moments Jaruzelski sided with the
forces of political democracy a·nd reform. This helped propel Poland to a reconciliation
of the society, towards legitimate elections and to a transfer of power from the
communists to a noncommunist order. It set the stage for the emergence of a fairly
coherent transitional government which successfully introduced a far-reaching
economic~ and a somewhat less successful bureaucratic, policy and democratization
\

reform. Poland is a homogenous society compared to the multinational nature of the
Soviet Disunion, which made the transition a much easier po_litical road for Poland.
In contrast in the USSR, Gorbachev unleashed, through his reforms, political
forces that he did not anticipate would lead to a disintegration of the Union. -Glasnost
produced a regime_ of truth that involved airing the documentation in the Baltic states
of the complicity of Stalin with Hitler in the aggression against and takeover of the
Salties in 1939. Th.is dramatically accelerated the Baltic independence movements,
starting in Lithuania in 1988 and spreading as a sort of domino effect to other
republics, accelerating eventually to an unstoppable level.
In contrast to Jaruzelski, Gorbachev basically refused to side with the forces
of independence, since independence in this case rightly meant the-full dissolution of
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in 1990 to either straddle the issues and factions, or to manage the conflicts through
incremental evolutionary means. Eventually he failed to maintain the integrity of his
state and his gradualist reforms. As a result of the outrage of the attempted coup,
the centrifugal forces for disintegration into republic sovereignties were astronomically
increased, and the Soviet Disunion resulted in the Fall of 1991.
The economic reform, democratization, the process of building sovereignty and
capable legislatures, (much less effective bureaucracies), and the settling of
interrepublic issues in the former USSR are all in a transitory and chaotic stage
(especially in comparison to the transition in Poland).

In fact, the dE;?volution of

sovereignty, and the rise of intra and interrepublic conflicts actually further distracts
leaders from the need to take decisive action on economics and deepens ,the
intransigence of the problems of economic reform and recovery. In classic political
development theory (Almond) the crises of building a nation, state, identity,
legitimacy, production and distribution are all converging at·once in the former USSR,
not so much on the embryonic and uncertain CIS government, but on the new republic
governments. If anything, most of the republics (perhaps not the Salties and Russia)
have less institutional capacity and experience in managing such development and
crises than even the old center government had. The new republics have certainly
less overall capacity to manage such crises than exists in Poland'.s transitional new
social democracy .. The political road to anywhere is extremely rocky in the new
Soviet Disunion. (The road in Poland has gotten

a bit rockier as well, with a national
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November to 25% through the winter of 1991-2, over disco_ntent with unemployment
and social budget cuts. See New York Times, 6 Feb. 1992).
One interesting comparison can be made with the Polish situation of 1980 and
the CIS and Russian/Ukrainian situation of 1992.

In 1980-81 the external Polish

"pressure" was the possible intrusion of Soviet force, which seemed to goad the
Polish communists and military into devising a "martial law" plan, to restore state
communism to power,

or in Jaruzelski's mind, to "save the Polish nation,- if not

communism". In 1992, the Russian nationalist "enemy" is similarly painted out to be
the intrusive, corrupting, and exploitive West, allied with the fomenters of "ethnic
nationalism". Most of the CIS/Russian military hierarchy does not see these issues
through ·quite the same _colored lenses as do more nationalist factions, nor does it
sanction a "return to communism". Such a "coalition", if indeed it is one, is founded
on quite disparate goals and objectives beyond the immediate common ground of
discontent with· the Yeltsin government.

There is a mutual rhetoric among the

partners that expresses a yearning to "restore the nation" (read Russian imperial or
security priorities). But there the similarity of goals ends. The comparison of the
international power situation surrounding the 1980 and 1992 cases is also very
different. For one thing, the internal power of Yeltsin's government is well beyond
'

-

the capacity Solidarity had to manage its fate in 1980. More important, the external
reality of the independent power of Ukraine, and the independent s'tatus of other CIS
states strongly checkmates or limits of the power of any future nationalist/milita.ry

\

-27regime in Russia almost strictly to Russian borders.

(A possible exception:

the

competing Russian and Ukrainian claims over the Crimean peninsula have the seeds
of a potential conflict between the two giant republics).
A last point to note is that Soviet style communism in both nations did not have
the legitimacy or capacity to survive a descent into military rule, and military rule itself
was incapable of political survival. Whether or not the Russian republic can now
manage to avoid this descent is also an open question. The outcomes of the
disastrous and ill-fated flirtations with military rule in Poland and the former USSR will
spin-out many effects for the world system for decades to come.
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